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I.
OBJECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant Perry D. Odak ("Mr. Odak") objects to Appellee
Peggy

B.

Odak's

("Mrs. Odak")

statement

of

the

case

in

the

following respects.
1.

Mrs. Odak asserts that in a conference call with the

court the day prior to the hearing that counsel and the court
agreed that the matter could be presented to the court by way of
proffers of testimony.

[Appellee's Brief, p. 2 ] .

In fact, the

agreement was that the parties would proffer the evidence they
intended to present and then the court would determine if it wanted

to hear any evidence before ruling on the motions before the court.
[R. 409].
2.

Mrs. Odak states the only persons present

in the

courtroom at the hearing that could have been called as witnesses
to

testify

misleading.

were

the

parties

themselves.

This

statement

is

In fact, a number of depositions had been taken of

witnesses located in Ohio.

[R. 414 and 424].

II.
ARGUMENT

A.

MR. ODAK DID NOT STIPULATE OR AGREE THAT THE COURT

COULD MAKE EVIDENTIARY FINDINGS WITHOUT TAKING EVIDENCE.

Mrs. Odak argues that because at the hearing Mr. Odak did
not

specifically

request

that

the

court

hear

evidence

before

issuing its ruling, Mr. Odak consented to the manner in which the
proceedings were handled by the court and cannot complain about the
court's

failure to take evidence before making

an

evidentiary

ruling.

It is respectfully submitted that this argument is without

merit.
Mrs. Odak glosses over the fact that the court prior to the
hearing had already determined that it would proceed by taking
proffers of testimony and then the court would determine if it
wanted to hear evidence before ruling.

The court was entitled in

its discretion to proceed in that fashion.
2

After hearing the

proffers, the court could have determined to rule on the contempt
motion in such a manner that the court would not need to resolve
disputed issues of fact.
evidence.

In that event, there was no need to hear

For example, if the proffers demonstrated as a matter of

law that Mrs. Odak had denigrated Mr. Odak, the court could have so
ruled as a matter of law without hearing any evidence.

The problem

is that the court did not rule on the contempt motion as a matter
of law.
finding

The court ruled by purporting to make an evidentiary
that

Mr.

Odak

had

failed

to

prove

defamation

by

preponderance of the evidence without taking any evidence.

a

This

was clear error.
The only case cited by Mrs. Odak to attempt to support her
position is not on point.

In Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P.2d 1374 (Utah

App. 1994), the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict
orally after presentation of the plaintiff's evidence.

Plaintiff

contended that he was entitled to prior notice and a hearing.

The

court stated that motions for directed verdicts are typically made
orally during trial, that plaintiff received the usual notice for
the motion and hearing and that in any event the plaintiff had not
objected.

In the present case, Mr. Odak had no way of knowing

prior to the time the court actually issued its ruling that the
court would improperly include in its ruling findings on a disputed
factual issue without taking evidence.
Mr. Odak's proffer of evidence was clearly sufficient to
demonstrate

Mrs.

Odak

had

violated

3

the

divorce

decree

by

denigrating and defaming him.

It was clear, palpable error for the

court to decide to the contrary.

B.

THE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING PROOF OF DEFAMATION RATHER

THAN DENIGRATION.

The divorce decree prohibited the parties from denigrating
each other.

One of the meanings of the word denigration is to

defame a person.

But denigration has a broader meaning

defamation, including
belittle."

"to cast aspersions on, defame

that

. . .

or

[Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1989)].

It

was therefore error for the court in its ruling to implicitly
require that Mr. Odak prove the tort of defamation.
Mrs. Odak argues that the court's ruling was justified
because

at

the

hearing

Mr.

Odak's

"defamation" in arguing the matter.

counsel

used

the

term

The fact that Mr. Odak's

counsel stated that Mrs. Odak had defamed Mr. Odak does not in any
way change the relevant provision of the divorce decree or what Mr.
Odak

was

violated.

required

to prove

Moreover,

Mrs.

in

order

to

Odak

does

not

show

the

fairly

decree

was

characterize

counsel's argument.
Mr. Odak's counsel clearly argued that the divorce decree
prohibited Mrs. Odak from denigrating Mr. Odak:
Paragraph 13 of the Divorce Decree stated that
the parties shall "not in any way denigrate each
other, publicly or privately, so as to negatively
affect each other's personal, professional or business
relations, harm each other's professional reputations,
or reduce each other's earning power." This provision
4

wasn't in the Divorce Decree just for the fun of it.
It was in there because my client, for many years, has
been a top executive of a number of important,
substantial companies.
It was obviously important
that his reputation remain the best it could be, and
that it not be denigrated by Mrs. Odak, and the
parties not engage in that type of name calling. . .
The depositions that we took demonstrate very
clearly that this provision has been violated by Mrs.
Odak. . . .
Judge, we would like there to be peace in the
valley at the end of this process.
It is very
important that this provisions of the Divorce Decree
be honored. It is very important to us that Mrs. Odak
be required to stop making derogatory statements
against Mr. Odak. . . . That's what we are asking for
the court to do. Thank you. [R. 424-25] .1
Mrs. Odak does not deny that Mr. Odak's proffer of evidence
was plainly sufficient to show denigration.

How could Mrs. Odak

possibly argue that her statements to third parties that Mr. Odak
is

conniving

and

devious,

pays

of

judges

and

witnesses,

is

vindictive, evil and dangerous, is capable of having people beat up
or injured, and that he was probably behind threats of physical
violence to her did not constitute denigration?

C.

MRS. ODAK IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.

Finally, Mrs. Odak argues that in the event this Court were
to affirm the district court's order, she should be awarded her
attorney's fees.

Mrs. Odak erroneously tells the Court in this

regard that she was rewarded her attorney's fees below.
1

Mr. Odak's counsel further stated that " . . . the Divorce
Decree says you don't make derogatory comments.
You don't
denigrate" [R. 431] and that Mrs. Odak should "stop bad-mouthing
Perry."
[R. 432].
5

Mr. Odak believes very strongly for all of the reasons
stated above that the district court's order should be reversed.
However, even if this court decides not to reverse the order, Mrs.
Odak is not entitled to her attorney's fees incurred on appeal.
Mrs. Odak was not, in fact, awarded her attorney's fees below.
Judge Brian ordered that in the event Mr. Odak paid the outstanding
judgments for spousal support no later than December 1, 1997 that
each party was to pay his or her own legal fees and costs.
undisputed

that

Mr.

Odak

did,

in

fact,

pay

the

It is

outstanding

judgments before December 1, 1997. Thus, Mrs. Odak was not awarded
her attorney's fees. Moreover, the conditional award of $10,000.00
in the event Mr. Odak did not pay the judgments related to the
motions
motion.

directed

to

spousal

support, not

Mr. Odak's

contempt

[R. 455]. There is no basis for awarding any attorney's

fees on appeal.2

III.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the district court's order should be reversed with respect to
the

finding

of

no

defamation

and

2

the

case

remanded

for

an

Management Services v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406
(Utah 1980), cited by Mrs. Odak, is clearly distinguishable. In
that case, the Utah Supreme Court merely held that it would adopt
the rule that if a party was entitled to recover attorney's fees by
contract the court would enforce that contractual provision by
awarding fees on appeal.
6

evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Mrs. Odak denigrated
Mr.

Odak

in

violation

of

the

decree

of

divorce.

alternative, the finding should be set aside.
DATED this fj

--day of September, 1998.
BURBIDGE Sc MITCHELL

js odak\appeal\brief-2
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